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The depiction of the European Union as an economic giant but political dwarf is a
classic, and criticisms for its failure to get its act together when it comes to foreign
and security policy are an old hat. With the recent events in Ukraine, however, EU
bashing has reached a new dimension. Political commentators and journalists sing
from the same song book. And the tune goes as follows: In the 21st century, Russia
and the US play a geostrategic game of the 19th century according to the rules of
the 20th century. In their competition over exclusive spheres of influence, Russia
got the Crimean (back) and the US keeps the rest in the West. Europe has either
been irrelevant in this power game or dealt one or two cards to the US. Either way,
the European Union and its member states have betrayed the values they seek to
uphold bowing to the power of Western energy companies, Russian oligarchs, US
imperialism, or Russia’s ambition to re-build the Soviet Union – pick your choice.
There is no question that the conflict over the Crimean involves geopolitics. While
all parties justify their actions by the need to protect democracy and human rights,
the bidding over Ukraine’s territorial integrity is also about economic and security
interests. Yet, in the 21st century, immaterial and material interests are intimately
linked. For once, in a globalized economy, the prosperity of Western democracies
and the survival of the Russian rent-economy both depend as much on the energy
supply from Russia. More importantly, Western democracies share the belief that
democracy is the best way to ensure security and prosperity in the long run. So
do many Ukrainians that have been holding out in Maidan, first, to dispose of an
autocratic and corrupt regime, and then to protest against the land-grab by an
external autocratic regime. The European Union has been an important reference
point for their demands of democracy and (international) rule of law. After all, it was
the refusal of former president Yanukovitch to sign the Association Agreement with
the EU last November that triggered the protest movement in the first place.
The European Union and its member states might have underestimated the
political costs of the Association Agreement for President Yanukovich. They did not
anticipate how far President Putin would go to protect what he sees as Russia’s
national interests in its near abroad. And the EU certainly failed to prevent the
annexation of the Crimean, which could set a precedent for pro-Russian secessionist
regions in other Eastern Partnership countries (Moldova, Georgia). Yet, what should
the EU have done? Offering a membership perspective to Ukraine in return for
political reforms would have been unlikely to make Yanukovich cut his own power
by strengthening the judiciary, reforming electoral laws, and fighting corruption.
Moreover, it would have fueled Putin’s anxieties of a “Western expansion” even
further. Providing massive financial aid to counteract Ukraine’s dependence
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on Russia would have empowered a corrupt and autocratic regime rather than
transforming it. Trying to reach a compromise with Putin over the Association
Agreement with Ukraine might not only have invoked memories of the 19th and
20th century. It would have been unlikely to work in Putin’s world of competing
spheres of influences. Imposing strict sanctions early on against Putin’s attempts
to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity could have easily escalated into military
conflict, a risk that seems hardly justified given that Putin is the ultimate loser of his
own geopolitical game – precisely because the European Union has largely resisted
playing along.
True, Russia won the Crimean, and Putin’s domestic approval rates have sky-
rocketed. Yet, this is likely to be a Pyrrhus victory. Economically, the Rubel fell. So
have the stock values of many Russian companies and the trust of foreign investors.
Internationally, Russia is completely isolated, no country likes the idea of a foreign
regime grabbing part of its territory, and this includes China. Russia can’t have it
both – be accepted by the international community but not wanting to play by its
rules. Putin’s foreign policy has accelerated Russia’s fall from a rising power to a
rent-seeking economy that has little in common with the emerging markets of Brazil,
India or China. The loss in economic and political power will drive Ukraine but also
other countries in Russia’s near abroad even more towards the West.
The EU might have failed to actively shape the developments in its Eastern
neighbourhood, arguably because it has refused to buy into Putin’s world of
geopolitics. This is not to say, though, that it has not had any influence. Despite its
external failures, it is the internal success of the EU in transforming Europe into a
region of lasting peace, prosperity and security that draws post-Soviet countries
to the European Union. The depiction of the European Union as an economic
giant but political dwarf is a classic, and criticisms for its failure to get its act
together when it comes to foreign and security policy are an old hat. With the recent
events in Ukraine, however, EU bashing has reached a new dimension. Political
commentators and journalists sing from the same song book. And the tune goes as
follows: In the 21st century, Russia and the US play a geostrategic game of the 19th
century according to the rules of the 20th century. In their competition over exclusive
spheres of influence, Russia got the Crimean (back) and the US keeps the rest in the
West. Europe has either been irrelevant in this power game or dealt one or two cards
to the US. Either way, the European Union and its member states have betrayed
the values they seek to uphold bowing to the power of Western energy companies,
Russian oligarchs, US imperialism, or Russia’s ambition to re-build the Soviet Union
– pick your choice.
There is no question that the conflict over the Crimean involves geopolitics. While
all parties justify their actions by the need to protect democracy and human rights,
the bidding over Ukraine’s territorial integrity is also about economic and security
interests. Yet, in the 21st century, immaterial and material interests are intimately
linked. For once, in a globalized economy, the prosperity of Western democracies
and the survival of the Russian rent-economy both depend as much on the energy
supply from Russia. More importantly, Western democracies share the belief that
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democracy is the best way to ensure security and prosperity in the long run. So
do many Ukrainians that have been holding out in Maidan, first, to dispose of an
autocratic and corrupt regime, and then to protest against the land-grab by an
external autocratic regime. The European Union has been an important reference
point for their demands of democracy and (international) rule of law. After all, it was
the refusal of former president Yanukovitch to sign the Association Agreement with
the EU last November that triggered the protest movement in the first place.
The European Union and its member states might have underestimated the
political costs of the Association Agreement for President Yanukovich. They did not
anticipate how far President Putin would go to protect what he sees as Russia’s
national interests in its near abroad. And the EU certainly failed to prevent the
annexation of the Crimean, which could set a precedent for pro-Russian secessionist
regions in other Eastern Partnership countries (Moldova, Georgia). Yet, what should
the EU have done? Offering a membership perspective to Ukraine in return for
political reforms would have been unlikely to make Yanukovich cut his own power
by strengthening the judiciary, reforming electoral laws, and fighting corruption.
Moreover, it would have fueled Putin’s anxieties of a “Western expansion” even
further. Providing massive financial aid to counteract Ukraine’s dependence
on Russia would have empowered a corrupt and autocratic regime rather than
transforming it. Trying to reach a compromise with Putin over the Association
Agreement with Ukraine might not only have invoked memories of the 19th and
20th century. It would have been unlikely to work in Putin’s world of competing
spheres of influences. Imposing strict sanctions early on against Putin’s attempts
to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity could have easily escalated into military
conflict, a risk that seems hardly justified given that Putin is the ultimate loser of his
own geopolitical game – precisely because the European Union has largely resisted
playing along.
True, Russia won the Crimean, and Putin’s domestic approval rates have sky-
rocketed. Yet, this is likely to be a Pyrrhus victory. Economically, the Rubel fell. So
have the stock values of many Russian companies and the trust of foreign investors.
Internationally, Russia is completely isolated, no country likes the idea of a foreign
regime grabbing part of its territory, and this includes China. Russia can’t have it
both – be accepted by the international community but not wanting to play by its
rules. Putin’s foreign policy has accelerated Russia’s fall from a rising power to a
rent-seeking economy that has little in common with the emerging markets of Brazil,
India or China. The loss in economic and political power will drive Ukraine but also
other countries in Russia’s near abroad even more towards the West.
The EU might have failed to actively shape the developments in its Eastern
neighbourhood, arguably because it has refused to buy into Putin’s world of
geopolitics. This is not to say, though, that it has not had any influence. Despite its
external failures, it is the internal success of the EU in transforming Europe into a
region of lasting peace, prosperity and security that draws post-Soviet countries to
the European Union.
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